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Senior official: 2008 crucial to surge success

The military’s surge in Iraq “is clearly working,” but many hurdles remain on the path to the stability that was the strategy’s ultimate goal, while al-Qaida in Iraq “remains a potent force,” according to the senior Defense Department official responsible for Middle East policy.

“We are finishing up what I consider to be the first phase of the surge,” retired Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt, the deputy assistant secretary of defense for near eastern and south Asian affairs, said at the National Defense Industrial Association’s special operations and low-intensity conflict symposium in Washington, D.C., on Tuesday.

When President Bush announced that he was proceeding with the surge strategy on Jan. 10, 2007, “it was a controversial decision…which many in the government — most notably, many in the military — did not support,” Kimmitt said. “But frankly it was becoming quite apparent that the current strategy wasn’t working, the conditions on the ground were deteriorating and the violence was growing on a … day to day basis.”

Thirteen months later, “although there’s much work to be done, the military surge is clearly working,” said Kimmitt, who previously was the senior military spokesman in Iraq. “It has succeeded to this point not simply because of the decision of the president but also because of the operational shift to a more counterinsurgency-type model rather than the one that we were working before, the one that some people call ‘transitional kinetics.’” The surge’s success is also due to “the great leadership that we have on the ground … leaders whose brilliance has been demonstrated and validated over the past year,” he added.

But, Kimmitt said, other factors behind the successes of the past year, such as the Sunni Awakening movement in which Sunni tribesmen in Anbar province who had been part of the insurgency turned against al-Qaida, and the ceasefire called by firebrand Shi’a cleric Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army (known by its Arabic initials JAM) came as a surprise. “The success of the surge was not pre-ordained nor has the surge succeeded according to plan,” he said. “No-one last December [2006] had any ideas that we would see a Sunni Awakening movement, nobody knew that the JAM would declare a ceasefire, nobody could forecast the brilliant successes of our special operators against al-Qaida, but as everyone knows, fortune favors the bold and chance favors the prepared mind.”

This year will be crucial, according to Kimmitt.

“Will this be the year when the gains in security are met by gains in stability, or will the tremendous tactical gains achieved by our troops be withered away because of a lack of political consensus and the lack of political reconciliation?” he asked rhetorically.

“The surge will be a success if those gains in security can be translated into gains in stability,” Kimmitt said. “It’s certain that the next phase will be far more difficult as it depends more on the Iraqis themselves to show progress on key legislation, show progress in their economy and to show progress in reconciliation.”

The fact that this had not happened in 2007 “is a bit of a disappointment” and “a bit disheartening for our troops,” he said, “because the plan had always suggested that the military progress would be accompanied side by side with the political progress.”

Kimmitt advised his audience to keep track of the following nine “leading indicators” in Iraq over the next year:

1. “Will the Iraqis be able to pass the key initiatives on de-Ba’athification, provincial powers [and] hydrocarbon sharing? Short of sectarian violence, nothing will be more important than ratifying and inscribing into law these key reconciliation initiatives.”

2. “Will the [Nouri al-] Maliki government embrace or reject or slow roll the Concerned Local Citizens program, [now called] the Sons of Iraq program? Will the Shi’a government consider these movements to be an American-armed coup force in waiting, threatening the gains made by the Shi’a since the fall of Saddam, or will the government recognize that the best way to end the insurgency is by bringing the insurgents into the fold?

3. “Will these Concerned Local Citizens and the former insurgents begin to turn their allegiance to the central government of Iraq? Right now the CLCs, the Sons of Iraq, are on our side, they’re supporting the Americans, but eventually, for this to really resonate, they’re going to have to start believing in supporting their own central government.”

4. With the U.S. and Iraqi governments conducting “strategic framework negotiations” intended to produce rules to govern the U.S. military’s role in Iraq after the United Nations mandate expires at the end of 2008, “is there going to be room for accommodation and continuation of military operations in 2009 and beyond?”

5. “I’d advise people to watch Basra,” Kimmitt said, referring to the southern Iraqi city where British forces have chosen to operate with what he described as a “very, very light hand.” “The Basra experiment will important in 2008,” he said. “It’s going to be interesting to see who wins out in the end in Basra: the free-market entrepreneurs who want Basra to look like Dubai, Iranians who want Basra to look like Herat [in western Afghanistan], or local militias who want Basra to look like Mogadishu?”

6. The actions of Iraq’s neighbors will also play a critical role, Kimmitt said. “See if they make the rough decisions and recognize that a stable and secure Iraq is in their best interests,” he advised his audience, listing several related issues: Will those neighbors “relieve the country of the burden of the Saddam debt? Will they take the risk and send ambassadors to Baghdad? ... Particularly the Sunni governments, will they vocally support the Baghdad government even though it’s primarily a Shi’a government?”

7. “Will the Iraqi security forces continue their surge, a surge which has resulted in more Iraqi forces being brought into the fight, and, frankly, the Iraqis continuing to take more than three times the casualties that the American forces are taking? Frankly, the Iraqi security forces were the unsung heroes of 2007 and they will need to take the front stage in 2008.”

8. “Keep an eye on Moqtada [al-Sadr]. Will he be able to rein in his special groups? Will he be able to regain and maintain control over the Jaysh al-Mahdi? Will he continue his ceasefire in 2008, or is his organization going to splinter and now become another problem on the battlefield for our troops?”

9. “I’d also tell you to watch al-Qaida. Despite the tremendous successes of [Lt. Gen.] Stan McChrystal and JSOC [Joint Special Operations Command, which has the primary responsibility for attacking al-Qaida in Iraq], al-Qaida remains a potent force, capable of another series of Samarra-like attacks,” Kimmitt said, referring to the 2006 bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samarra that precipitated Iraq’s descent into open sectarian conflict. “Will they carry out such operations in 2008? Is Stan going to be able to stay on top of them and keep them on the run? Are they going to be able to turn around and conduct more and more attacks like we saw last week where they strapped suicide belts onto young retarded women? The fact that al-Qaida is doing that ought to speak for itself and it also is a very, very strong sign of how successful Gen. McChrystal and his forces have been.”