McChrystal pushes to grow Afghan Army - Army News | News from Afghanistan & Iraq - Army Times

McChrystal pushes to grow Afghan Army

Gen. Stanley McChrystal’s recommendation to generate more Afghan National Army combat power faster by building light infantry forces at the expense of artillery and support units represents an acknowledgment that previous plans did not take full advantage of the unique strengths of the U.S. and Afghan forces.

The recommendation is contained in an annex to McChrystal’s assessment of the security situation in Afghanistan that was leaked to The Washington Post and subsequently released in unclassified form by the Defense Department. That document states that the ANA’s previously programmed growth from 92,000 to 134,000 by December 2011 needs to be brought forward to October 2010, with a requirement for further growth to an estimated end strength of 240,000 “in order to increase pressure on the insurgency in all threatened areas in the country.”

But the new plan not only accelerates the ANA’s growth, it also calls for the creation of a more infantry-centric force in the near term.

“In order to generate the required numbers of ‘boots on the ground,’ the emphasis will be on the development of maneuver units rather than enabler capabilities,” the assessment states. “The generation of previously planned and programmed enablers such as corps engineers, artillery, motorized quick reaction forces, and large support battalions will be deferred to enable a more rapid generation of maneuver forces that provide the operational capabilities required now.”

The new infantry forces will be equipped at a “‘minimally combat essential’ level,” and initially housed in “austere” facilities that will include tented camps, according to the McChrystal assessment, and their primary mission will be to “hold” territory that has been cleared by other forces, although the assessment says that they will also have “some ‘clear’ capability while closely partnered with coalition forces.”

That close partnership with U.S. and other coalition forces will mitigate “risks inherent in this approach such as inadequate training and lack of organic enablers,” according to the assessment.

The “recalibrated approach” is a recognition that the previous model of building ANA kandaks (battalions) nested within brigades, divisions and corps, was not “optimizing the development of that which is most important for your counterinsurgency: [forces to] protect the population,” said a Pentagon official who tracks Afghanistan issues closely.

It only made sense to have coalition forces continue to provide logistical support to the ANA in the near future, rather than divert resources to stand up an ANA support capability from scratch, according to the Pentagon official. “If we take folks away from doing the logistics to continue to train the logistics, then we are debiting from where our comparative advantage is right now,” the official said.

The new approach is also “playing to where the Afghan strength is,” the official said. He defined this strength as “basic, carry a Kalashnikov, learn how to do population protection and those types of things, maybe instead of chasing bad guys.” For the more static “holding” mission “you don’t need a lot of indirect fires and fire support, you’re going to rely upon that which your allies have,” he said.

Under McChrystal’s plan, the new ANA light infantry will be able to fight “at company, platoon or even if necessary, kandak level, but … always in the company of U.S. platoons,” the Pentagon official said.

The partnership, which will see U.S. platoons partnered with ANA companies, is modeled on the 82nd Airborne Division’s 4th Brigade Combat Team, which is currently deploying to Afghanistan to train and mentor Afghan national security forces in the south and the east of the country, he said.

The efforts to grow the ANA and the other Afghan national security forces will be accompanied by other attempts to provide security to the Afghan population, he said, citing the pilot Afghan Public Protection Program, or AP3, in Wardak province as an example. Under that program, local citizens form militias to protect their villages under the tutelage of Special Forces teams.

Lt. Gen. David Rodriguez, who will oversee day-to-day coalition operations in Afghanistan starting in mid-October, is considering whether to expand AP3 to other provinces in the country’s south, west and north that are being targeted by the Taliban and associated groups such as the Islamic Jihad Union and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the Pentagon official said.

Over the next few weeks Rodriguez will visit those provinces and confer with Afghan Defense Minister Rahim Wardak, ANA Chief of Staff Gen. Bismullah Khan and local leaders “to see whether or not those programs should be looked at for those particular areas,” the official said.

The outcome of those deliberations is far from certain. “There are mixed results” for the AP3 pilot in Wardak, the Pentagon official said. However, he added, if Rodriguez believes that the AP3 approach can work in several additional provinces, expect to see similar programs implemented in those provinces over the next several months.