The Army boasts a strong commitment to its Holistic Health and Fitness program, known as H2F. Yet step outside the gym or off the PT field on almost any Army installation and the choices confronting soldiers tell a different story: rows of fast-food restaurants, vending machines loaded with ultra-processed foods and convenience stores where energy drinks and alcoholic beverages outnumber fresh fruit.
This disconnect represents a structural failure that undercuts H2F. After millions of dollars have been committed, senior leaders must pair H2F with policy that reshapes the on-post food environment, so a culture of health and fitness is not only preached during PT but also practiced at the point of purchase. Without enforceable nutrition standards across all vendors and measured improvement in food landscapes, the Army will continue to fund performance training while feeding a system that undermines it.
Soldiers’ opinions have been clear and consistent. In 2019, focus groups across multiple installations captured the sentiment that “nutrition is out of our control,” citing the density of fast-food outlets on post, higher costs for nutritious foods, small or unappealing DFAC options and long lines that push troops toward quicker, less healthy alternatives. Objective measures echo those perceptions. A recent multi-installation Military Nutrition Environment Assessment (mNEAT) produced an average score of just 52% (out of 100%), demonstrating a poor nutrition environment that does not promote readiness. According to the study, fast-food venues provided the least healthy options, yet they represent the largest number of food venues by type on Army installations. Soldiers feel conflicted. On one hand, they are told to perform as tactical athletes, pushing further and faster with increased lethality. On the other hand, they are surrounded by greasy, unhealthy and ultra-processed food options.
The resulting health and performance effects are predictable. Obesity in the active-duty force has risen markedly over the years, causing health issues that result in non-deployability, injury, illness, and attrition. Diet quality is suboptimal across the force: too few fruits, vegetables and whole grains and too much added sugar and saturated fat — patterns linked to higher musculoskeletal injury risk, slower recovery, degraded physical and cognitive performance and chronic diseases later in life. When researchers translate these health and performance issues into dollars, they estimate tens of millions of dollars annually in avoidable costs from attrition, medical claims, injuries and lost productivity contributed to poor nutrition.
For years, soldiers have been told to overcome their poor diet with education and willpower. Yet this recommendation is not rooted in science, which shows environments drive behavior more powerfully and more durably than knowledge alone. While military commissaries and dining facilities serve the healthiest options, they make up only 13% of the nutrition landscape. Most on-post meals come from concessions, exchanges, food trucks and contracted food vendors that are not bound to performance-oriented standards.
With a renewed focus on lethality, we must demand change. Army senior leaders cannot remain idle, investing millions into H2F, yet failing to create an environment to support human performance optimization. There are multiple steps to be taken that require policy change.
First, extend nutrition standards across every venue where soldiers buy food on post. The federal Food Service Guidelines already specify evidence-based targets for menu composition, healthy beverages and balanced food options. This wouldn’t mean that items such as french fries would be taken away, but it would drastically increase the amount of healthy options compared to less healthy items at each venue. If vendors want access to soldiers, their menus, marketing and pricing should align with readiness — not undermine it.
Second, engineer healthy convenience food options so that fast does not mean nutritionally empty. Behavioral design elements, such as healthy defaults, prominent placement, clear labeling and pricing incentives, consistently improve selections in cafeterias, convenience outlets and vending, and they are built into both the federal Food Service Guidelines and the mNEAT framework. The Army’s Go for Green program has translated these tactics into dining facilities, with evaluations showing better nutrition literacy and healthier choices when implemented with fidelity. The same playbook should extend to shoppettes, micro markets, morale and welfare venues, food trucks and vending so that grabbing something quickly supports performance.
Finally, installation commanders must be responsible for the food environment in their installation. Require annual mNEAT assessments across all installation venues, publish results to command teams and tie improvement to performance objectives. In the multi-installation mNEAT study, overall scores ranged from the low 30s to the low 60s, and teams identified practical fixes once leadership engaged and had clear data. That is the feedback loop H2F needs and soldiers deserve, and it is well within our control.
The Army will always demand discipline from individuals. It should also demand coherence from the system. If H2F is truly about building a lethal and resilient force, then nutrition must be treated as a key operational element. The food environment should be regulated where soldiers buy food, designed into the places they eat and measured like any other readiness enabler. If H2F is to be more than a slogan, the Army must make policy changes. This is a call to action for our senior leaders. This is not a lifestyle crusade; it is a readiness requirement.
Maj. Christina Deehl is an active-duty Army registered dietitian with experience in human performance optimization, currently serving at the Medical Center of Excellence. She received her master’s degree in dietetics from Baylor University and is a doctoral candidate in Health and Human Performance at Concordia University Chicago. The views and opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not reflect the official position of any organization with which she is affiliated. She can be reached at christina.e.deehl.mil@army.mil.
